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Abstract
Spatio-temporal information is very important to capture the discriminative cues be-
tween genuine and fake faces from video sequences. To explore such a temporal fea-
ture, the fine-grained motions (e.g., eye blinking, mouth movements and head swing)
across video frames are very critical. In this paper, we propose a joint CNN-LSTM net-
work for face anti-spoofing, focusing on the motion cues across video frames. We first
extract the high discriminative features of video frames using the conventional Convo-
lutional Neural Network (CNN). Then we leverage Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)
with the extracted features as inputs to capture the temporal dynamics in videos. To
ensure the fine-grained motions more easily to be perceived in the training process,
the eulerian motion magnification is used as the preprocessing to enhance the facial
expressions exhibited by individuals, and the attention mechanism is embedded in
LSTM to ensure the model learn to focus selectively on the dynamic frames across the
video clips. Experiments on Replay Attack and MSU-MFSD databases show that the
proposed method yields state-of-the-art performance with better generalization ability
compared with several other popular algorithms.
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1. Introduction
As a convenient biometrics based authentication, automatic face recognition has
attracted increasing attention during the past decades owing to it’s convenience and
high-efficiency on access control applications. Despite significant recent advances,
the security of face recognition systems is still challenged. Face recognition systems
are vulnerable to spoofing attacks with printed photos or relayed videos if protective
measures are not implemented. Generally, a practical face recognition system demands
not only high recognition performance, but also the capability of distinguishing the
attackers (fake faces) from real persons (genuine faces).
In biometric based face recognition systems, spoofing attacks are usually perpe-
trated using photographs, replayed videos and forged mask. Fig. 1 shows some gen-
uine and fake face images from MSU-MFSD [1], where we can see no obvious visual
cues are available to pick the fake images from the gallery. However, considering that
many of the spoofing attacks are carried out by replaying a recording video, the motion
patterns contained in the genuine and the spoofing video sequences may be different.
For example, facial motions such as eye blinking and mouth movement are not con-
tained in video frames of photograph, while exist in video frames of real person and
replayed attack videos. Meanwhile, additional motion patterns such as hand-trembling
is inevitable brought in the replayed attack videos, if the attack equipment is hand-
held. These motion cues are very valuable to distinguish valid access of attempted
attacks, and also the relative motion between the face region and the background can
be helpful. Generally, the methods using motion cues are expected to have better gen-
eralization ability than other methods, considering the motion patterns are not vary due
to replay attacks.
In this paper, we proposed a joint CNN-LSTM architecture for the purpose of ro-
bust face anti-spoofing, focusing on the motion cues across video frames. We have
also proposed several strategies to ensure the motion cues be used sufficiently. Two
publicly databases, the Replay Attack [2] and MSU-MFSD have been used to evaluate
the performance of the proposed method, using the official protocols. Cross-database
experiments are also performed to evaluate the generalization ability. The main contri-
2
(a)
(b)
Fig.1: Genuine and fake face images selected from MSU-MFSD database. (a) Genuine images. (b) Fake
images.
butions of our work can be summarized as follows:
• We propose to use the LSTM-CNN architecture to learn the temporal features
and make use of the motion cues across video frames for face anti-spoofing.
• The Eulerian motion magnification approach is used as the preprocessing to en-
hance the facial expressions exhibited by individuals.
• The attention mechanism is embedded in the LSTM to selected dynamic key
video frames.
• A confusion loss layer based on LSTM loss and CNN loss is created to balance
the learning level of CNN and LSTM for the purpose of better generalization
ability.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Previous related works on face
anti-spoofing are discussed in Sect. 2. We describes the proposed framework in Sect.
3. The discussion and performance evaluation are presented in Sect. 4. Finally, we
draw the conclusion in Sect. 5.
2. Related Works
Recently, a large number of approaches have been proposed in the literature to
detect spoofing attacks based on photographs, replayed videos and forged masks [1, 3,
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4, 5, 6, 7]. Depending on the cues be used, existing face anti-spoofing methods could
be roughly categorized into two groups: static approaches and dynamic approaches.
Static approaches are mainly based on the analysis on texture differences between
live and spoof face image from the perspective of surface reflection and material dif-
ferences. These methods perform spoof detection using a single face image, and thus
have relatively fast response. In [8], the researches utilized the difference of structural
texture between 2D images and 3D images to detect spoofing attacks based on the anal-
ysis of Fourier spectra, where the reflections of light on 2D and 3D surfaces result in
different frequency distributions. Tan et al. [9] used a variational retinex-based method
and the DoG filters to extract the reflectance features on face images to distinguish fake
images from geunine images. In [10], Maatta et al. extracted the texture of 2D images
using the multi-scale local binary pattern (LBP) to generate a concatenated histogram
which was fed into a SVM classifier for the classification of fake and genuine faces.
They showed that concatenation of three Local Binary Patterns (LBP) descriptors of
different configurations is more efficient than local phase quantization as well as Ga-
bor wavelet based descriptor for print attack spoofing detection. In their later work
[11], a score level fusion approach was proposed using LBP, histogram of oriented gra-
dients and Gabor wavelets computed from the local blocks of face images. The authors
reports 0% Half Total Error Rate (HTER) on the Print Attack dataset. To include the
temporal features which described the faces’ dynamic structure for face anti-spoofing,
Pereira et al. [12] proposed the LOP-TOP, considering three orthogonal planes inter-
secting the center of a pixel in theXY direction,XT direction and Y T direction,where
T is the time axis. According to their experimental results, multi-resolution LBP-TOP
with SVM classifier achieved the best HTER OF 7.6% on the Replay Attack dataset. In
the work [13], Boulkenafet et al. analyze the joint color-texture information from the
luminance and the chrominance channels using a color local binary pattern descriptor
and showed excellent results according to their experimental results.
Dynamic approaches make use of the liveness information across the input video
frames, such as eye blinking, lip movement and head movement [14]. Some dynamic
method include ”intrusive interactions”, in which the user is forced to follow some
instructions. Pan et al. [15] detected the eye blinking for anti-spoofing using a non-
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intrusive method, a conditional random field was constructed to model different stages
of eye blinking. In [16], Kollreider et al. presented an approach to detect spoofing
attacks by combining eye blinking and mouth movement with 3D properties of face
images. Facial motions such as eye blinking and head movement were used to deter-
mine liveness by some participants of the IJCB facial spoofing competition [17]. In
[18], Shreve et al. proposed a temporal stain metric computed from optical flow pat-
terns on the facial regions to recognize the subtle facial features in video sequences for
the use of detecting spoofing attacks. In the later work [19], Bharadwaj proposed to
enhance the micro- and macro facial expressions for more robust detection of spoof-
ing attacks. Two feature extraction algorithms, a configuration of local binary pattern
and motion estimation using histogram of oriented optical flow, were used to encode
texture and motion (liveness) properties respectively. Their work yields state-of-the-art
performance and robust generalizability with low computational complexity according
their experimental results.
Apart from these hand-crafted features, some approaches based on CNNs [3, 4, 5]
have also been proposed to automatically learn features for face anti-spoofing since
the hand-crafted features are designed specifically and a new dataset may result in
bad performance. CNNs have been successfully applied to various problems such as
image classification [20], object recognition[21] and semantic segmentation [22]. The
liveness face detection tasks based on video clips can be regarded as the problems of
videos classification instead of images classification with a temporal dimension added.
Xu et al. firstly introduced the LSTMs for the use of face anti-spoofing in [23]. LSTMs
have been use to achieve state-of-art performance in several tasks such as sequence
generation [6], speech recognition [7] and video description [24] and have shown great
power in learning patterns along time series. They proposed to have CNNs underlying
the LSTMs, where the local and dense property from convolution operation could be
leveraged and the temporal feature across frames can be learned and stored in LSTM
units. A limitation to their work is that the spatial locations of receptive fields are
mixed in fully connected layers, and neuron activations from fully connected layers do
not encode spatial information [25, 26, 27], therefore the features from fully connected
layers indicates no location information which is valuable for capturing motion cues.
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3. The proposed framework
Our work focusing on the motion cues across video frames. A major difference
between convolutional and fully connected layer activations is that the former is em-
bedded with rich spatial information while the latter is not [27]. To ensure the motions
cues adequately be used, we use the features from convolutional layers instead of the
full connected layers. Eulerian motion magnification and attention mechanism [28, 29]
are used to enhance the motion cues. A confusion loss layer based on LSTM loss and
CNN loss is created to balance the learning level of CNN and LSTM.
3.1. Magnification of Facial Expressions
Eulerian motion magnification has been proposed in [30] to reveal temporal vari-
ations in videos that are difficult or impossible to see with the naked eye and display
them in an indicative manner. This Eulerian based method could successfully reveals
informative signals and amplifies small motions in real-world videos.
The motion magnification methods takes a standard sequence as input, and ap-
plies spatial decomposition, followed by temporal filtering to the frames. Let I(x, y, t)
denotes the video frame at position (x, y) and time t. If the observed intensities
change over time is denoted as a displacement function δ(t), such that I(x, y, t) =
f(x + δx(t), y + δy(t)), where δx(t) and δy(t) are the displacement functions in x
and y directions respectively. The goal of motion magnification can be expressed as
follows:
Iˆ(x, y, t) = f(x+ (1 + α)δx(t), y + (1 + α)δy(t)) (1)
where α is a magnification factor. Under the first order Taylor series expansion about
x and y directions, the video I can be rewritten as
I(x, y, t) ≈ f(x, y) + δx(t)∂f(x, y)
∂x
+ δy(t)
∂f(x, y)
∂y
(2)
Let B(x, y, t) be the result of applying a broadband temporal bandpass filter to the
input video I at every position (x, y), such that all the components except f(x, y) are
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filtered. B(x, y, t) can be represented as
B(x, y, t) = δx(t)
∂f(x, y)
∂x
+ δy(t)
∂f(x, y)
∂y
(3)
Thus, the processed video Iˆ(x, y, t) can be expressed as
Iˆ(x, y, t) = I(x, y, t) + αB(x, y, t) (4)
Combining Eqs. 1,2,3 and 4, the motion magnified video Iˆ can be finally rewritten as
Iˆ(x, y, t) = f(x, y) + (1 + α)[δx(t)
∂f(x, y)
∂x
+ δy(t)
∂f(x, y)
∂y
] (5)
Compared Eq.2 and Eq.5, we could conclude that the spatial displacement δ(t) of the
local image f(x, t) at time t, has been amplified to a magnitude of (1 + α). The effect
of magnification is highly dependent on the filter and the magnification factor α used.
In our work, the value of α is selected optimally by visual inspection of the proposed
videos from the training dataset.
To demonstrate the results of this motion magnification preprocessing method, a
video clip has been chosen and shown in Fig. 2 in XY-T and XT-Y view, where T
represents the time axis. The original frames are taken at equal time intervals. As there
are no motions contained in the static photo-video (Fig. 2(a)), no obvious changes in
both the pre-magnification and after-magnification video can be observed in XT view
(see Fig. 2(b) and (c)). However, for the video contains dynamic facial expressions
(Fig. 2(d)), significant changes across frames can be observed in XT view (see Fig. 2(e)
and (f)). Compared with the video pre-magnification, the changes on facial expression
and head movement are much more significant in the video after-magnification (color
marked regions in columns (e) and (f)).
3.2. Spatial Feature Extraction
To fully make use of static frame appearance, we used the VGG-16 [31] based
structure for spatial feature extraction. The VGG-16 is a very deep convolutional net-
work with up to 16 weight layers (13 convolutional layers and 3 fully-connected lay-
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(Photo) Pre-magnification After-magnification Pre-magnification After-magnification 
XY-view 
(Video) 
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Eye blink 
Mouth 
movement 
Head  
movement 
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XT-view XT-view 
Fig.2: Column (a) shows the video of fixed photos in XY view, columns (b) and (c) are the
corresponding images in XT view without and with magnification, respectively. Column (d)
is the video with dynamic facial expressions in XY view, columns (e) and (f) represent the
corresponding images in XT view without and with magnification, respectively.
ers). It takes 224 × 224 images as input, each convolution has a kernel of size 3 × 3,
and all max-pooling layers are performed in a 2× 2 window with stride 2. We used the
pre-trained ”VGG-Face” [32] model to initialize the parameters of the network. The
”VGG-Face” was trained on a massive face data set of 2.6M images of 2622 subjects.
We assume that both genuine and fake face images are involved in this data set, and use
the idea of transfer learning to transfer the ”knowledge” that learned by VGG model to
our new task of face anti-spoofing. Transfer learning can be used to avoid overfitting
in the training of our network, considering the current publicly available face spoofing
datasets are too limited to train a generalized network.
Similar with the work in [23], we propose to have the CNNs underlying the LSTMs,
therefore the local and dense property from convolution operation could be leveraged
and the temporal feature across frames can be learned and stored in LSTM units. Fig.
3(a) shows the overall framework of the proposed joint CNN-LSTM model. The re-
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Fig.3: (a) The flowchart of the proposed CNN-LSTM framework. (b) The cascaded LSTM
architecture. (c) Illustration of a single LSTM unit, the current state t depends on the past state
t1 of the same neuron.
leased VGG-Face model was used to initialize the parameters of the network. Since
the CNNs learn more generic features on the bottom of the network and more intri-
cate, dataset-specific features near the top of the network [33], the pre-trained last 3
fully-connected layers were removed and only the convolutional and max-pooling lay-
ers were reserved. Another important reason we discarded the fully-connected layers is
that the neuron activations from fully-connected layers do not encode spatial informa-
tion, which is extremely important for capturing motion cues in the following LSTM
architecture. Therefore, the last pooling layer of the CNN architecture is connected di-
rectly to the LSTM, the pooling layer contains rich spatial information which could be
taken use of by the LSTM to explore the temporal features across continuous frames.
3.3. The LSTM and Attention Mechanism
Since the input of our architecture are videos which contain dynamic content, the
variations between video frames may encode additional useful information for the dif-
ferentiation of genuine and fake faces. To capture the temporal dynamic information
across frames, we proposed to use the Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) [34] ar-
chitecture to explicitly consider sequences of CNN activations. The LSTM units can
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discover long-range temporal relationships from the input sequences by making use of
the memory cells, which could store and output information.
As illustrated in Fig. 3(b) and Fig. 3(c), each LSTM unit has a memory cell (Ct)
and three gates: the input gate (it), output gate (ot) and forget gate (ft). The mem-
ory cell (Ct) could store and output information, allowing it to better discover long-
range temporal relationships. The gates serve to modulate the interactions between the
memory cell itself and its environment. The input gate controls how much the input
influence the internal state by multiplying the cell’s non-linear transformation of inputs
gt. The output gate decides how much the internal state to transfer to the unit output.
The forget gate can modulate the memory cell’s self-recurrent connection, allowing the
cell to remember or forget its previous state, as needed. The LSTM unit updates for
timestep t are:
f t = σ(Tfx
t +Rfh
t−1 + bf ) (6)
it = σ(Tix
t +Rih
t−1 + bi) (7)
gt = φ(Tgx
t +Rgh
t−1 + bg) (8)
Ct = gt  it + Ct−1  f t (9)
ot = σ(Tox
t +Roh
t−1 + bo) (10)
ht = φ(Ct) ot (11)
For timestep t, xt and ht are the input and output, respectively. T is the input weight
matrix, R is the recurrent weight matrix, and b is the bias vector. σ(x) = 11+e−x and
φ(x) = e
x−e−x
ex+e−x are the element-wise non-linear activation functions, mapping real
values to (0, 1) and (-1,-1), respectively.
Along with the training of LSTM, we propose to encode the hidden sequences into
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a fixed-length vector c = (x1, x2, ...xN ):
c =
N∑
i=1
αihi i ∈ 1, ..., N (12)
where hi is the hidden state at time ti, and the weight αi is the corresponding weight
mapping hi to vector c. At each time step , αi is computed by
αi =
exp(W>i hi−1)∑N
j=1 exp(W
>
j hi−1)
(13)
where αi can be thought of as the probability that reflecting the importance of
the hidden state hi. This attention mechanism decides which frames from the input
sequences should be paid attention to. After calculating these probabilities, the model
could focus on the samples with dynamic changes instead of taking expectation over
all the input sequences. The fixed-length vector c is finally connected to the softmax
layer to compute the class specific probabilities.
To balance the learning level of CNN and LSTM for the purpose of better general-
ization ability, we proposed a loss combining strategy to train the joint network, where
the CNN batch loss and the LSTM loss was combined and trained simultaneously.
4. Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed joint CNN-LSTM
framework on two popular benchmark datasets. We first give a brief description of
these two datasets. Performance evaluation of the proposed method along with several
popular baseline methods are then reported using the same protocols.
4.1. Experimental settings and Datasets
All the input video frames are resized to 224× 224. Instead of only using the face
region as the input, we extend the border of the face region to include some background,
as the relative movement between the face and the background is very important for
LSTM to capture temporal information. The network is trained using the AdamOp-
timizer in tensorflow with the learning rate of 0.00001. Batch normalization layer
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is used to ensure inputs to a layer are normalized. The experiments were conducted
on two up-to-date publicly available face anti-spoofing datasets, MSU-MFSD [1] and
Replay-Attack [2]. Following are the brief introductions of the two datasets:
MSU-MFSD : These dataset contains 280 video recordings of genuine and attack
faces. 35 individuals have participated in the development of this database with a to-
tal of 280 videos. Two kinds of cameras with different resolutions (720 × 480 and
640 × 480) were used to record the videos from the 35 individuals. For the real ac-
cesses, each individual has two video recordings captured with the Laptop cameras
and Android, respectively. For the video attacks, two types of cameras, the iPhone and
Canon cameras were used to capture high definition videos on each of the subject. The
videos taken with Canon camera were then replayed on iPad Air screen to generate the
HD replay attacks while the videos recorded by the iPhone mobile were replayed itself
to generate the mobile replay attacks. Photo attacks were produced by printing the 35
subjects’ photos on A3 papers using HP colour printer. The recording videos with re-
spect to the 35 individuals were divided into training (15 subjects with 120 videos) and
testing (40 subjects with 160 videos) datasets, respectively. 30 real access videos and
90 attack videos are contained in the training dataset, while 40 real accesses and 120
attack videos are include in the testing dataset.
Replay-Attack : 50 subjects with a total of 1200 videos regarding 50 subjects are
contained in this dataset. For each subject, 4 genuine video sequences are collected in
front of controlled and adverse backgrounds. The first condition was under uniform
background and office lights turned on, while the second condition was under non-
uniform background with the office lights off. As for attack videos, three spoofing de-
vices are used, including print attack, video attack and digital photo attack. The spoof-
ing sequences were captured from fixed support and hand-hold mediums under the
adverse and controlled background, respectively. The evaluation protocol divides this
dataset into training (360 videos), testing (480 videos) and development (360 videos)
subdatasets. The training and development subdatasets each contains 60 real accesses
videos and 300 attack videos, whereas the testing subdataset contains 80 real accesses
and 400 attack videos.
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Table 1: Comparison results of intra-test on Repaly-attack and MSU-MFSD.
Datasets Metrics
Methods
LBP LBPM LBP -TOP LBP -TOPM CNN CNNM CNN -LSTM CNN -LSTMM
Replay-attack HTERe(%) 0.18 2.82 4.25 5.75 2.70 5.18 0.00 0.00
(controlled) ACC(%) 99.80 97.05 95.00 92.86 96.11 92.59 100 100
Replay-attack HTERe(%) 4.67 5.65 12.25 13.25 4.41 5.40 4.49 3.53
(adverse) ACC(%) 95.06 94.02 90.0 87.86 94.47 93.70 94.51 96.47
MSU- HTERe(%) 11.63 14.62 24.17 28.75 16.06 19.73 13.74 10.36
MFSD ACC(%) 88.37 85.38 85.0 84.38 89.57 85.20 86.26 89.64
Table 2: Comparison results of inter-test between different pairs of datasets. The
training set of the first column are used to train the model, whereas the test-
ing set of the second column are used for testing. The superscript M means
magnification operation, while superscript A stands for attention mechanism.
Datasets
Metrics
Methods
Train Test LBP LBP -TOP CNN CNN -LSTM CNN -LSTMM CNN -LSTMA CNN -LSTMAM
Replay-attack Replay-attack HTERe(%) 14.00 13.94 25.38 31.32 23.10 23.70 15.28
(adverse) (controlled) ACC(%) 80.00 80.98 73.91 78.63 80.66 80.60 84.70
Replay-attack MSU- HTERe(%) 39.79 32.93 48.60 32.43 30.15 29.52 25.72
(adverse) MFSD ACC(%) 60.27 64.38 50.16 68.98 70.99 71.15 78.65
MSU- Replay-attack HTERe(%) 37.04 30.50 37.11 23.63 14.75 18.97 12.37
MFSD (controlled) ACC(%) 62.96 70.71 62.88 79.15 81.17 80.77 82.32
4.2. Experimental Protocols and Performance Metric
We followed the default protocols offered in this two databases, however, consid-
ering that no development set is contained in MSU-MFSD dataset, we equally split the
testing set into a couple, the development set and the new testing set. To be specific,
there are 30, 40 and 30 subjects used for training, testing and development in Replay-
Attack database, respectively, while the training, testing and development datasets in
MSU-MFSD each contains 30, 20 and 20 subjects, respectively.
To keep consistent to previous work, Half Total Error Rate (HTER) was used as the
metric in our experiments. HTER is defined as:
HTER =
FAR(τ,D) + FRR(τ,D)
2
(14)
where FAR is the measure of the likelihood that the biometric security system will
incorrectly accept an access attempt by an unauthorized, and FRR is the measure of the
likelihood that the biometric security system will incorrectly reject an access attempt
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by an authorized user. Since both False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection
Rate (FRR) depend on a certain threshold τ , increasing the FAR will usually reduce
the FRR and vice-versa. In this case, we used the development set to determine the
threshold τ corresponding to Equal Error Rate (ERR) for the computing of HTER,
following the previous works [3, 23]. The testing accuracy (ACC) achieved by each
methods is also calculated for comparison.
Three popular methods, LBPu28,1 [10], LBP -TOP [12] and the standard CNN, are
used to compare with the proposed approach on the same experimental protocols. The
features captured by the LBPu28,1 and LBP -TOP are all fed into SVM to obtain the
final classification results. For the LBP method, all the consecutive frames of each
video clip of the training set were used to extract the 59-dimensional holistic features,
and to train the SVM classifier. The final results were achieved on the test set by
averaging the probabilities of all the consecutive frames per video clip. The features of
LBP-TOP were extracted per video clip, as this method involved the spatio-temporal
information from video sequences. The traditional CNN is also implemented for the
comparison with the proposed CNN-LSTM framework where the structure of CNN
keep unchanged.
4.3. Intra-test Restluts
Table 1 illustrates the results of intra-test between different methods on the datasets
of MSU-MFSD and Repaly-Atttack. As can be seen, all the methods listed achieve
fairly good performance on the three datasets. For the methods LBP, LBP-LOP and
standard CNN, the HTERs with magnification are relatively lower and the ACCs are
higher than that without magnification. This is reasonable, as we found when applying
the Eulerian algorithm for motion magnification, the image qualities of the magni-
fied video clip were influenced although the motions across the frames were ampli-
fied. However, based on the comparisons between CNN-LSTM and CNN-LSTMM ,
it’s easy to draw the conclusion that the motion magnification significantly improves
the performance of CNN-LSTM joint framework, this is mainly because more mo-
tion information were perceived and leveraged by the LSTM when applying motion
magnification on the input video clips. It is also important to take note of the results
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of CNN on Replay-attack (controlled) and Replay-attack (adverse), where we observe
a relatively worse performance even compared with artificial features LBP and LBP-
TOP. Actually, in the training phase, the CNN accuracy on this two datasets was nearly
100 percent. The degraded performance is mainly attributed to over-fitting, consider-
ing the images contained in Replay-attack (controlled) and Replay-attack (adverse) are
too limited to tain a generalized deep network. However, the training and testing im-
ages used in CNN-LSTM is the same with the method of CNN, while this over-fitting
problem doesn’t exist, indicating that the joint CNN-LSTM framework can effectively
overcome the overfitting problem, since more cues can be used for the discrimination
of genuine and fake face images.
4.4. Inter-test Results
To evaluate the generalization ability of the proposed method, we conduct inter-test
on the three datasets. Dataset A is firstly used to train the model and dataset B is used
for testing. The inter-test results are reported in table 2. As can be observed, among all
the methods listed in Talbe 2, CNN-LSTM with both magnification and attention mech-
anism achieve the best inter-test performance in general. The worst inter-test results are
achieve by LBP and CNN, since these two methods only keep focus on static picture
information, non of the features regarding motions are used. If external environment
(such as background, lighting, camera resolution, etc.) is changed, these static features
may be totally different. For approaches LBP-TOP and CNN-LSTM, as these methods
exploit more generalized features: (temporal information across frames) which does
not alter with the change of external environment, the inter-test results reported by these
approaches are much better than LBP and CNN. The performance achieved by CNN-
LSTMM and CNN-LSTMA are both slightly better than CNN-LSTM, suggesting that
the video magnification preprocess and attention mechanism are both contribute to the
distinction of genuine/fake faces. With the video magnification some subtle motions
would be amplified to be perceived by LSTM, and with the attention mechanism the
LSTM can concentrate mainly on key frames that contain dynamic information.
For Replay-Attack-adverse and Replay-Attack-controlled datasets, only the illumi-
nation condition is different, other factors like spoofing materials and individuals are
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keep unchanged, therefore the domain shift is not serious between these two datasets.
This is the reason why all the approaches listed achieved the best performance by test-
ing across these two datasets. However, the MSU-MSFD database is totally different
from Replay-Attack database, where the spoofing materials, individuals and illumi-
nation conditions are all different. As a result, the differences between these two
databases are quite serious, and the performance degenerate significantly when inter
testing cross these two datasets.
5. Conclusions
Due to the variety of materials among spoofing devices, current face anti-spoofing
approaches usually suffer from poor generalization. The generalization ability of face
anti-spoofing needs to be significantly improved before they can be adopted by practi-
cal application systems. In this paper, we keep focus on a more generalized features, the
fine-grained motions across video frames, for the purposed of robust face anti-spoofing.
The LSTM is used to extract temporal features from the input videos, while eulerian
motion magnification and attention mechanism are proposed to ensure LSTM make
full of the dynamic changes exhibited by individuals. To demonstrate the effective-
ness of the proposed method, intra-test and inter-test are performed on two challenging
datasets, and several popular methods are implemented for comparison. The experi-
mental results verify that this dynamic changes contained in the temporal features are
quite helpful to improve the generalization ability of the proposed approach.
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